The Privacy Gambit: Toward a Game Theoretic Approach to International Data Protection by Anderson, Horace E
DRAFT 
 
6/18/2004 2:58 PM (2K) 
[Game Theory & Privacy Proposal - Horace Anderson.doc]  
The Privacy Gambit 
Toward a Game Theoretic Approach to International Data Protection 
Horace Andersona1 
“Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step 
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the 
individual . . . ‘the right to be let alone.’”1
- Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, 1890 
“You have zero privacy anyway.  Get over it.”2
- Sun Microsystems CEO 
Scott McNealey, 1999 
 
I. Introduction
“Privacy” doctrine is currently one of the most high profile 
and most vexing areas of the law.  Its recent prominence is due at least in 
part to the explosion of the Internet over the past decade3-- a new wave of 
“recent inventions and business methods” to rival developments in the 
fields of photography and publishing in the time of Warren and Brandeis.4
Its vexatious nature is due to the inconsistent comparisons that are 
 
a1 Associate Professor, Pace Law School.  I would like to thank Mandy Tran 
and Paul Babchik for their able research assistance, and Don Doernberg, 
James Fishman, and Gayl Westerman for their insightful comments. 
1 Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
2 See Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: Get Over It, Wire News, January 26, 
1999. 
3 See, e.g., Patricia Buckley, Technology Consulting Forum: Electronic 
Commerce in the Digital Economy, 7/26/99 ACCOUNTING TODAY 9920802, 
at 1999 WLNR 5561547. 
4 Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1. 
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sometimes drawn between the various flavors of privacy in the public 
discourse.   
When we speak of privacy in the Internet age, a distinction 
needs to be drawn between what I will call “traditional privacy,” the law of 
whether and to what extent the state can intrude in the private sphere of an 
individual5, and “data protection” or “information privacy”, the regulation 
of the use of personal information about individuals by non-state interests, 
such as corporations.6 Unfortunately, much of the public discourse on the 
subject adopts a framework (and a concomitant set of expectations) more 
suitable to traditional privacy, an inviolable “right to be let alone” by the 
state.7 As a number of commentators have recognized, the modern 
incarnation of privacy, rather than creating or reinforcing a sacrosanct right 
 
5 Examples of US Federal legislation in this sphere include the Privacy Act 
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (regulating the collection, use, and transfer of 
personal information by federal government agencies); the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (limiting access to, and 
release of, customer financial records by financial institutions); and the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 
and §§ 2701-2709 (prohibiting interception and disclosure of certain 
electronic, wire, and oral communications.  Additionally, and importantly, 
these rights are protected by the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution and the jurisprudence interpreting them.  See, e.g., Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n,
514 U.S. 334 (1995); Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S. 479 (1965); 
Whalen v. Roe, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958).  
6 In the area of information privacy, the Federal government has enacted, 
for example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et 
seq.; the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 
U.S.C. § 1320d; the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 5 
U.S.C. § 6501 et seq.; and the Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 15 
U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (commonly known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
7 See, e.g., Susan Llewelyn Leach, Privacy Lost With the Touch of a 
Keystroke?, 11/10/04 CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 15, at 2004 WLNR 
6716743; William Safire, Medical Intrusiveness Puts Privacy Rights on the 
Ropes, 3/11/04 SAN MATEO COUNTY TIMES, at 2004 WLNR 17216303. 
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against the government, actually creates a quasi-property right, where 
personal data is a valuable commodity and access to it is negotiable.8
Given the negotiable nature of information privacy, concepts 
from economics in general, and game theory in particular, can be useful in 
framing and explaining the ways in which actors in our information privacy 
“system” actually conduct themselves vis-à-vis personal information.  Scott 
McNealey’s opinion notwithstanding, individuals in today’s society do have 
some measure of privacy protection.  The potency of that protection ebbs 
and flows, depending in part on the strategic choices made by a number of 
individual and institutional actors, including the individual him or herself.   
This article briefly explores several scenarios in which 
economic actors compete and cooperate in order to capture the value in 
personal information, and then focuses on one particular scenario: the 
ongoing interaction between the United States and the European Union in 
attempting to construct data protection regimes that serve the philosophies 
and citizens of each jurisdiction, as well as provide a strategic economic 
advantage.  A game theoretic model is presented to explain the course of 
dealings between the two actors, including both unilateral and bilateral 
actions.  Opportunities for seizing competitive advantage, and for fostering 
cooperative mutual advantage, through government action are explored, 
several likely equilibrium states are posited, and a single ultimate 
equilibrium is predicted. 
Part II explores the literature on commodification and 
negotiability of information in order to explain the contextual nature of 
modern privacy, and, further, introduces a number of the contexts and 
actors among which information interactions take place.  Then, Part III 
focuses on a single context and a single pair of actors, the United States and 
European Union.  This part describes their divergent philosophies regarding 
data protection, the conflicting legislative results that have flowed from 
those philosophies, and the attempts at “solving” the privacy conflict 
between these two actors via negotiation.  Part IV expresses the US-EU 
privacy conflict as an extensive form game, explains the history of 
interaction between the actors in terms of such game, and assesses the 
 
8 See generally Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal 
Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L. J. 2381 (July 
1996); Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the 
Anticommons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899 (2003); Jerry Kang & Benedikt 
Buchner, Privacy in Atlantis, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 230 (Fall 2004). 
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current negotiated “solution.”  Finally, the article concludes with a 
consideration of the traditional game theoretic underpinnings of the 
alternative outcomes and assesses the likely stability of the equilibrium 
achieved. 
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II. Negotiability and Contextuality of Privacy
A. Commodification and Negotiability of Information 
It is no secret that for many of the more developed 
participants in the global economy (including the United States), knowledge 
goods or information have supplanted manufactured goods as the main 
engine of commerce.9 Increasingly, the “commodity production of 
knowledge” is the focus of advanced economies.10 Even in the 
manufacturing sectors, the processing of information about the goods sold, 
and about those who purchase and use them, is as important as the 
production and shipping of the goods themselves.11 In what has been called 
an “unprecedented proliferation of records and data,” vast fields of 
information about people and their activities populate large and valuable 
databases.12 In the modern information economy, even navigating 
 
9 By some estimates, “as much as three-quarters of the value of publicly 
traded companies in America comes from intangible assets,” leading 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan to deem America’s economic 
output “predominantly conceptual.”  See Kenneth Cukier, A Market for 
Ideas, The Economist 3 (October 22, 2005). 
10 See Paula Baron, Databases and the Commodification of Information, 49
J. COPYR. SOC’Y U.S.A. 131 (2001) 
11 One example of this development is the increased research by 
manufacturers into the use of Radio Frequency Identification (“RFID”) 
technology to track the movement of consumer goods.  A product 
embedded with an RFID tag can transmit information about when it leaves 
the factory, when it leaves the warehouse, when and where it is purchased at 
retail, and, in combination with credit card information collected at the 
point of purchase, by whom it is purchased at retail. Wal-Mart, the world’s 
largest retailer, is in the midst of an initiative that, by the end of 2006, will 
require all of its suppliers to use RFID technology on products shipped to 
Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club stores.  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Expands RFID 
Mandate, RFID JOURNAL (August 18, 2003) available at 
www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/539/1/1/; Laurie Sullivan, Wal-
Mart Outlines RFID Expansion Plans, INFORMATION WEEK (June 17, 
2004), available at 
www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=22100511. 
12 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and 
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001) 
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ostensibly non-commercial activities may involve perusing databases for 
pertinent (and thus currently valuable) information.  So, not only do we 
contribute information to commercial databases every time we buy a DVD 
online or use a frequent shopper card at the market, we also make use of 
information stored in databases when we search TiVo for the particulars of 
a favorite program or peruse a bus schedule.13 Individuals are both 
producers and consumers of commodity information. 
Although, as discussed above, personal information has 
become a valuable commodity, its value is not necessarily inherent at its 
most granular level.  That is, a single piece of information (such as a last 
name), or information about a single individual, or even information about a 
single transaction involving an individual, may not be interesting or 
valuable in isolation.  Personal information is actually the building block of 
a value-added asset, such as the sort of robust database of customer profiles 
and preferences that allows an Amazon.com to provide “1-Click” ordering, 
Wish Lists, and product recommendations for its regular customers.14 As 
with other valuable assets and their inputs, private actors vie to monetize, 
trade, and capture the value of, information assets, including personal 
information.  As with bananas or steel, states may seek to benefit from the 
trade in these valuable assets among private actors. 
Given information’s status as a commodity that can be built 
into a valuable asset, characterizations of information privacy rights as stark 
and inviolable, especially as against private actors, seem incomplete at best.  
 
13 See Baron, supra note 11, at135; Solove, supra note 13, at 1394. 
14 Amazon’s 1-Click ordering allows the user to accelerate the purchase 
process by storing credit card, billing address, and shipping address 
information in a customer profile.  The order can be processed with the 
click of a single on-screen button.  Wish Lists allow users to store their 
shipping information along with a list of gifts that they would like to 
receive.  The user’s friends and family can then presumably be directed to 
amazon.com, where they purchase a desired item, which is shipped 
automatically, using the stored information.  Amazon provides its  
“Recommendations” service by examining a user’s past purchases and past 
ratings of items.  By comparing purchasing behavior of other users whose 
purchase history overlaps with that of the first user, the company 
recommends future items for consideration.  See 
www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/508510/ref=br_lr_/102-
4428196-8289759. 
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Actors in the marketplace for information assets, including individual data 
subjects, negotiate, sometimes overtly, sometimes tacitly, over access to 
personal information and its attendant value.  Examples of these 
negotiations are legion.  Consumers routinely provide personal financial 
data to financial services companies in exchange for credit, or at least a 
chance at credit (No mortgage applicant seriously expects to receive access 
to hundreds of thousands of dollars without providing reams of such 
personal information).  Customers of consumer products companies provide 
their e-mail addresses in exchange for notification of a merchant’s sales and 
special offers.  Registered users of e-commerce sites such as Amazon.com 
register as a prerequisite to the company’s collecting the type of purchase 
history data that makes product recommendations possible.  Even outside 
the consumer context, individuals often provide personal data regarding 
previous employment (including salary and performance data), in exchange 
for an opportunity for new employment. 
It is not the case that all uses of personal data smack of either 
Big Brother or pernicious spam.  Many uses are a result of some give and 
take among participants in an information marketplace, who, given the 
structure of the modern economy, might be seen as inevitable dealers in 
information assets.15 Without some dealing in data, search costs would be 
higher for both merchants and consumers, pricing would be less efficient, 
merchants would have less accurate portraits of their customers, and there 
might even be higher incidence of fraud.16 Absent a negotiation over use of 
personal data, many on-line transactions could not occur at all.17 Overall, 
the marketplace in personal information has been said to promote lower 
costs for businesses and for society as a whole.18 
15 See Jay Weiser, Measure of Damages for Violation of Property Rules: 
Breach of Confidentiality, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 79 (2002). 
16 Id. at 80-81. 
17 On many e-commerce sites, a customer must reveal an e-mail address in 
order to create a “paper” trail that allows for tracking of the order and 
notification of delivery date.  Although some sites provide for alternative 
payment information, the bulk of e-commerce transactions require use of a 
credit card. 
18 Robert W. Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of 
Online Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 85, 86 (2002).  See also Id. 
at 106 (describing how information collection and credit reporting facilitate 
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This notion of negotiability of privacy is not without its 
problems.  Imposing a negotiation framework on the privacy question 
implies arms-length dealings where the parties have information about, and 
are constrained by, for example, their respective costs, target prices, and 
reserve prices.19 However, while the “price” of an individual’s data may be 
readily apparent in some situations (in order to receive a 
confirmation/receipt, I must provide my e-mail address), in many other 
situations it is far from obvious.  The consumer may have no idea what 
price she should charge a merchant for her data and thus may have a 
difficult time receiving true “market value.”20 
Further, the “negotiation” may often be forced on the 
consumer.  Think of the confirmation/receipt example given above.  What if 
the consumer does not care about receiving a confirmation and does not 
want to hear from the merchant until the product is delivered?  Requiring an 
e-mail address to complete the transaction forces the consumer into the 
information exchange.  Finally, the collection of data by companies may 
impose an externality on the consumer; the company benefits from each 
collection, but does not bear much in the way of cost.  Merchants may tend 
to over-collect personal information in many cases.21 According to Daniel 
Solove, the explosion of the use of targeted marketing rather than mass 
marketing has led to data collection that “extends beyond information about 
the consumer’s views of the product to information about the consumer 
herself, often including lifestyle details and even a full psychological 
profile.”22 
pooling of loans, increasing creditor liquidity and making more funds 
available to borrowers at lower cost). 
19 The target price is the price at which each side would ideally like to 
conclude the transaction.  The seller’s reserve price is the minimum price 
that she will accept, and the buyer’s reserve price is the maximum price that 
he will pay. 
20 See Robert W. Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of 
Online Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 85, 103 (2002) 
21 See Id. at 102. 
22 Daniel J. Solove, supra note 13, at 1404. 
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As a practical matter, the negotiability of privacy will turn on 
issues of power and leverage.  Solove uses Kafka’s The Trial to 
conceptualize the privacy problem: “Kafka depicts an indifferent 
bureaucracy, where individuals are pawns, not knowing what is happening, 
having no say or ability to exercise meaningful control over the process.  
This lack of control allows the trial to completely take over Joseph K.’s life.  
The Trial captures the sense of helplessness, frustration, and vulnerability 
one experiences when a large bureaucratic organization has control over a 
vast dossier of details about one’s life.”23 The frustration described by 
Solove explains the periodic public outcry over a particular announced use 
or misuse of personal information24, as well as attempts by users of personal 
 
23 Id. at 1421. 
24 For example, in 2000, Internet advertising company DoubleClick stirred 
up controversy, and attracted the scrutiny of the New York State Attorney 
General and the Federal Trade Commission, when it announced plans to 
purchase a company called Abacus Direct.  The acquisition would have led 
to the mingling of non-personally-identifiable information long collected by 
DoubleClick, and personally-identifiable information on many of the same 
individuals residing in Abacus Direct’s databases.  At the time, 
DoubleClick’s privacy policy promised users that the company would never 
merge information it collected in such a way as to identify an individual.  
Faced with possible action by the FTC and by various states because of the 
inconsistency in its stated policy and its actions, DoubleClick abandoned 
the plan to merge the data.  See, e.g., Jeri Clausing, US Investigating 
DoubleClick Over Privacy Concerns, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/02/cyber/articles/17doubleclick.ht
ml; Crisis Control @ DoubleClick: FTC, Michigan & NY; Stock Takes a 
Hit, Privacy Times February 18, 2000, available at 
http://www.privacytimes.com/NewWebstories/doubleclick_priv_2_23.htm. 
In 1997, several database companies, including LEXIS-NEXIS, came 
under fire for providing their customers with database access to personal 
information about individuals, including Social Security numbers.  In 
response to consumer complaints and the threat of legislative and regulatory 
action, LEXIS-NEXIS pulled much of the most sensitive information from 
its P-Track service.  See, e.g., Timothy Burn, Database Companies Agree to 
Police On-line Information on Net Users, The Washington Times June 11, 
1997 B12. 
 Also in 1997, online portal Yahoo! discontinued its reverse telephone 
directory, which had allowed users to access the name and address of an 
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information to assuage that frustration.  An example of such an attempt is 
the corporate Website privacy policy.25 Compounding the control issue is 
the question of who deserves control, or, rather, who deserves to capture the 
value associated with the information?  Is the individual the sole architect of 
the value of the information?  Or is the information formed in relationships 
with others and given value through the consolidation and categorization 
functions performed by advertisers and marketers?26 Paula Baron 
characterizes the debate over privacy and the use of data as being “about the 
struggle for ownership in pure information.27 The struggle may also be 
characterized as one for the economic/marketing value represented by 
personal information.  As discussed further infra, the struggle defined by 
Baron is ongoing, contextual, and advanced by a potential host of players 
beyond the individual and his bookseller. 
B. Contextuality of Privacy 
Because neither the negotiability of data privacy, nor the 
marketplace in which individuals negotiate for the value of their 
information, is inherently or entirely good or evil, examinations of 
information privacy rights should not be made in isolation.  Rather, data 
privacy rights must be assessed in view of the circumstances surrounding 
the data transaction.  Solove emphasizes that privacy should be viewed 
pragmatically, as a contextual and dynamic legal phenomenon, rooted in the 
 
individual by entering that person’s telephone number.  The company cited 
e-mail complaints received from users as the reason for abandoning the 
service.  See, e.g., Yahoo Pulls Phone Search, available at 
http://news.com.com/Yahoo+pulls+phone+search/2100-1023_3-
259291.html.
25 Some commentators have criticized such policies as a meaningless 
exercise.  See Solove, supra note 13 at 1451 (decrying privacy policies as 
“self-indulgent, making vague promises such as the fact that a company will 
be careful with data; that it will respect privacy; that privacy is its number 
one concern . . . phrased in a vague, self-aggrandizing manner to make the 
corporation look good.”) 
26 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 
1113 (2002). 
27 Paula Baron, Databases and the Commodification of Information, 49 J. 
COPYR. SOC’Y U.S.A. 131 (2001). 
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“concrete, historical, and factual circumstances of life.”28 Privacy, and in 
particular, information privacy, “is not reducible to a single set of neutral 
conditions that apply to all matters we deem private.”29 Rather than 
possessing a singular, immutable “universal value,” across all contexts, 
privacy rights depend on their particular social context and the relative 
importance of the information practices comprising that context.30 
If we are to deal with the privacy issues raised in the modern 
information environment, we must accept the contextual nature of privacy 
rights.  If we are to navigate the contextual nature of privacy rights, we 
must recognize the limitations of traditional paradigms for analyzing those 
rights.  Using the example of U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission, Solove points out that part of the difficulty experienced by 
courts adjudicating privacy cases is that they are conceptualizing issues 
regarding the modern collection and use of personal information by 
companies as if there is no difference between that context and that of any 
other privacy problem.31 In U.S. West, the telecommunications carrier used 
First Amendment grounds to challenge FCC rules implementing consumer 
privacy provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 222.32 Using the Central Hudson 
 
28 See Solove, supra note 26, at 1091. 
29 Id. at 1092. 
30 Id. at 1093. 
31 Id. at 1152. 
32 47 U.S.C. § 222, enacted as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
restricts use of, disclosure of, and access to Customer Proprietary Network 
Information, stating that “[e]xcept as required by law or with the approval 
of the customer, a telecommunications carrier that receives or obtains 
customer proprietary network information by virtue of its provision of a 
telecommunications service shall only use, disclose, or permit access to 
individually identifiable customer proprietary network information in its 
provision of (A) the telecommunications service from which such 
information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or used in, the 
provision of such telecommunications service, including the publishing of 
directories.”  47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1).  The statute provides exceptions for, 
inter alia, billing, fraud prevention, and inbound telemarketing and 
administrative services.    See 47 U.S.C. § 222 (d).  The challenged FCC 
rules required  an “opt-in” approach to customer consent, in which a 
customer’s prior express approval would have to be obtained before her 
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intermediate scrutiny test, the Court held that the FCC’s restriction on 
commercial speech did not directly and materially advance a substantial 
state interest.33 In questioning the substantiality of the state’s interest in 
protecting privacy, the court falls back on familiar and traditional ways of 
thinking about the harms that flow from inadequate privacy protection, 
specifically, the traditional tort paradigm.  The court was “fixated on a 
conception of privacy that views its invasion as a discrete harm, where the 
individual is left with specific injuries that can be readily translated into 
damages.34 In an information environment where some uses of personal 
information may cause harm, and some may be harm-neutral (or even 
beneficial) to the individual, it is clear that the old paradigms will not fit all 
modern contexts. 
Even Judge Richard Posner’s economic conception of 
privacy as secrecy does not always neatly fit the economic reality of usage 
of personal data in the Information Age.  Although one way of looking at 
privacy is as the right to secrecy, the right to “conceal discreditable facts,”35 
facts do not have to be discreditable for the individual to have an economic 
interest in concealing them.  Selective disclosure of facts about herself may 
be beneficial to the individual even if the facts are neutral.  For example, my 
e-mail address or snail mail address are neutral pieces of information with 
regard to my virtue, trustworthiness, or sense of honor.  Nevertheless, I 
might be selective about revealing this information to an interested party 
unless I gain some advantage from the revelation.  Will I receive discount 
coupons for giving my e-mail address to Old Navy?  Will I receive advance 
notice of sales in exchange for allowing Macy’s to mail me catalogs?  If I 
cease to be interested in Amazon’s book recommendations, can I remove 
my information from their active database at some future date?  The facts 
and situations within which an actor within the information system chooses 
disclosure are varied and mutable.  A mere pouring of our new wine into 
old bottles will not suffice, and updated paradigms of how multiple actors 
 
information could be used for marketing purposes.  See U.S. West, Inc. v. 
Federal Communications Commission, 182 F. 3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
33 182 F. 3d at 1240. 
34 Solove, supra note 26, at 1153. 
35 Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (6th ed. 2003).  See 
also Solove, supra note 26 at 1106. 
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(including individuals, companies, agents, administrative bodies, states, and 
supra-national organizations) actually treat personal information under 
various circumstances must be part of any privacy framework.  It is 
necessary to bear in mind always the “context and contingency” of uses of 
personal information.36 
C. Key Privacy Contexts, Characters, and Contours of Competition 
 What then are the contexts with which we should be 
concerned in understanding how the value of information is apportioned in 
the modern privacy landscape?  We may define these contexts in terms of a 
cast of characters vying to capture the value of the information, and also in 
terms of the structure of their struggle over that value.  Often, the characters 
are paired in a binary struggle.  For our purposes, we will consider the 
following characters, or types of actors within the privacy system:  
Individuals are just that, individuals who are either the subjects of the 
personal data in question, or interested in using the personal data of others.  
Legitimate Businesses are those businesses with which an Individual may 
have a relationship, or with whom an Individual would not categorically 
reject having a relationship in the future.  Illegitimate Businesses are those 
who would like to use an Individual’s data, but whom the Individual would 
reject as inappropriately risky users of that data.  A Domestic Government 
is the government of the state where an Individual or Business is domiciled, 
and a Foreign Government is the government of any other state. 
The first pairing of interest in the competition over the value 
of personal information is that of the Individual vs. the Domestic 
Government.  This is the first type of privacy scenario many people think 
about when they think about privacy, the “traditional” privacy mentioned 
earlier in this Article.37 Although this pairing is typically discussed in terms 
of civil liberties, individual rights, or constitutional rights,38 it may also be 
 
36 Solove, supra note 26, at 1127. 
37 Supra, 1-2. 
38 Examples of this view are: the right of the Individual not to have his 
telephone conversations monitored and/or recorded, the right not to be 
compelled by the state to reveal political or interest group affiliation, and 
the right to make certain personal decisions, such as the decision to use 
contraception, without state scrutiny or interference. 
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viewed through an economic lens.  In many situations in which a 
government may seek information about an individual, the information has 
value, and each actor may be characterized as trying to capture or retain the 
value of that information.  Think of the example of police surveillance of a 
criminal organization.  The identity and movement patterns of the boss of 
the organization would be of great value to the state in seeking to prosecute 
him as the head of a criminal enterprise and dismantle his gang.  
Information about meetings and conversations with known perpetrators of 
crimes would similarly be valuable to the state and its law-abiding citizenry.  
The boss and the members of his organization, however, derive great value 
from limiting the disclosure of such information.  If the information can be 
kept from the police, the boss can continue to lend his acumen to the 
enterprise, and the organization can continue to reap illegal profits.  Each 
side will take steps to secure the value of the information for its own 
“account,” including use of video and audio surveillance, informants, and 
undercover operatives on one side, and use of code words and 
intermediaries on the other. 
A second pairing of competitors for the value in personal 
information involves an Individual versus a Legitimate Business.  This is 
the classic case of a company’s coming into possession of a person’s 
information legitimately and seeking to make a marketing use of such 
information.  The information may be valuable because it allows the 
marketer to understand the customer better, and leads to further sales to a 
particular Individual.  An example of this type of value is the value of 
collecting and keeping purchase history information about a customer in 
order to make purchase recommendations to that same customer in the 
future.  The Business also may derive value from the information by 
combining it with information about other customers.  This allows the 
Business to recognize macro trends in the purchasing behavior of its entire 
customer base, or of relevant segments.  The Individual attempts to capture 
or reserve the value of her personal information by withholding certain 
information from the Business, or by extracting some benefit in exchange 
for the information.  In the latter circumstance, even though the Individual 
extracts a benefit, it is often the Business that sets the terms of the exchange 
and makes the offer.  For example, a company may give a discount (or 
ongoing discounts) in exchange for an application for a store credit card or 
membership card.  The Individual would also like to retain the value in her 
information by compelling the Business to offer an additional benefit for 
each use, or for each new use, or for each request for additional information.  
For example, the customer would like to receive a discount for signing up 
for a credit card, but there is no necessity for an e-mail address to be 
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included in the information requested on the application.  In exchange for 
providing an e-mail address, the Individual may want some ongoing benefit, 
such as periodic “members only” sales or previews.  
Of more concern to the Individual is her competition with 
Illegitimate Businesses for the value in her personal information.  For our 
purposes, an Illegitimate Business is one that may have acquired the 
personal information without the knowledge of the Individual, and that the 
Individual would likely reject as a holder or user of her information.  The 
classic case of this pairing is unsolicited commercial e-mail, or spam.  The 
Illegitimate Business seeks to capture value of the information (often, in the 
spam context, e-mail addresses) by adding it to bulk e-mail mailing lists.  
With very large bulk e-mail lists, the cost of sending each e-mail message is 
infinitesimal.39 As the size of a bulk e-mail list grows, the probability of the 
Illegitimate Business receiving a positive response, and a potential sale, 
increase.  Even though response rates to bulk marketing (including bulk 
mail and bulk e-mail) are extremely low,40 expansion of the mailing list 
allows the Illegitimate Business to apply its low response percentage to a 
larger base.  Meanwhile, the probability that the Individual wants to actually 
receive a solicitation from an Illegitimate Business is also extremely low.41 
It is in the Individual’s interest not to have her information revealed to the 
Illegitimate Business at all, and she “wins” the competition and retains the 
value of her information when the information remains unknown to the 
Illegitimate Business.  She may also score a limited win when she has the 
ability to spot and ignore, or filter out, e-mail messages from the 
Illegitimate Business, minimizing the costs imposed upon her and her e-
mail services provider by the Illegitimate Business.42 In the United States, 
 
39 See Michael A. Fisher, The Right to Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk 
Mail, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 363, 364 (Spring 2000). 
40 By some estimates, bulk mail response rates are as low as 0.6%, bulk e-
mail response rates are similarly less than 1%.  See Ian Ayres and Matthew 
Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 90-91 (Winter 2003). 
41 See Fisher, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS at 365 (Describing public 
complaints regarding spam received by the Federal Trade Commission and 
Securities Exchange Commission, and public calls for limits on electronic 
junk mail). 
42 The costs of spam are particularly irksome to Individuals, because such 
costs are almost completely externalized by the sender.  The marginal cost 
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the Domestic Government has entered this competition on the side of the 
Individual, passing the CAN-SPAM Act in 2003, and requiring, among 
other things, that advertising e-mails be labeled as such, that header 
information and subject lines not be misleading or deceptive, and that 
recipients be given the choice to opt out of receiving future e-mail messages 
from the sender.43 While measures such as CAN-SPAM are applicable to 
those Illegitimate Businesses that are domiciled domestically, they provide 
no aid to the Individual struggling against a foreign Illegitimate Business 
that is beyond the jurisdiction of the Domestic Government.44 
The Individual does not struggle only against organizations 
or companies over the value of her information.  Other Individuals seek to 
capture the value of the personal data as well.  Identity theft is an example 
of this privacy context.45 I will refer to the Individual trying to protect her 
information as the data subject, and the Individual seeking to profit from the 
data subject’s information as the identity thief.  The identity thief who is 
able to learn the right type of personal information about the data subject 
(name, address, telephone, Social Security number, credit card account 
numbers, etc., can derive benefits from posing as the data subject.  The 
identity thief can present himself as a creditworthy person with a stable 
well-paying job, and therefore qualify for a large one-time purchase, a 
consumer credit account, or even a loan.  Of course, because the thief is 
merely posing as a creditworthy Individual, he does not care about 
maintaining that creditworthiness.  He has incentives to default on whatever 
obligations he “assumes” while wearing his new identity.  Such inattention 
to maintaining the status of the data subject ultimately leads to losses for the 
 
to the Illegitimate Business will tend toward zero.  See, e.g., Ayres and 
Funk, 20 YALE J. ON REG. AT 136. 
43 CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
Pornography and Marketing Act), P.L. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2719. 
44 Generally, only bulk e-mail senders that are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Federal Trade Commission or certain other federal regulators such as 
the Securities Exchange Commission or Federal Communications 
Commission will have the CAN-SPAM Act enforced against them.  15 
U.S.C. § 7706. 
45 Identity theft is “the deliberate assumption of another person’s identity, 
usually to gain access to their finances or frame them for a crime.”  See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_theft. 
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data subject.46 The data subject’s main options for retaining the value of 
her information are being judicious about sharing of the information with 
others, and policing her credit reports for evidence that her information has 
been misappropriated. 
Finally, the competition over the value in an Individual’s 
information (or, more accurately, the information of many Individuals), 
may be played out between two States.  Commodification of personal data 
allows such data to be treated like other commodities in some ways.  
Information may become an object of the trade strategy and goals of a state 
or multi-state trade alliance.  Protection of the privacy rights of its citizens, 
or preservation of the value of that information for domestic users, may 
become part of a government’s foreign policy.  As such, the potential 
advantage inherent in valuable information may cause a State to enact new 
laws, vigorously enforce existing ones, seek to influence the lawmaking of 
its trading partners, reward its friends, and punish its rivals.47 As we will 
see later in this Article, information policy can be used to reinforce the 
cohesion of a trade alliance.   The next section explores the relationship 
between two governments, the supranational government of the European 
Union and the national government of the United States, with regard to 
information privacy policy.  We will see that, as with the other contexts 
discussed supra, the essence of the relationship is a contextual, ongoing, 
negotiation and competition over the value in the personal information of 
Individuals. 
 
46 The Federal Trade Commission has reported that nearly 10 million 
Americans were victims of identity theft in 2003, resulting in losses of 
approximately $5 billion.  The companies that did business with identity 
thieves (by selling them goods and services, and/or extending them credit), 
lost upwards of $47.6 billion on such transactions.  See Do You Know 
Where Your Identity Is?  Personal Data Theft Eludes Easy Remedies,
available at 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/index.cfm?fa=printArticle&ID=1176. 
47 For example, the European Union is viewed by many as heavily 
impacting commercial regulation beyond its borders, particularly in the 
areas of consumer protection, software, and technology, 
telecommunications, and data privacy.  See, e.g., Brandon Mitchener, Rules, 
Regulations of Global Economy are Increasingly Being Set in Brussels,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 23, 2003. 
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III. The United States, The European Union, and the State 
vs. State Context
A. Divergent Philosophies 
The United States and the nations of the European Union 
have traditionally held starkly different ideas about data privacy, including 
the appropriateness of government regulation of the collection and use of 
personal information by the private sector.  The essence of these differences 
can be understood by appreciating how each jurisdiction might answer two 
basic questions: First, to what extent is government regulation perceived as 
an effective and desirable way to provide for the needs of individuals?  
Second, to what extent is data privacy (as against private actors) considered 
a fundamental right of individuals?  The contrasting philosophies of the two 
jurisdictions set the stage for the dissimilar privacy approaches and 
outcomes that we observe in practice. 
Data protection in the European Union countries can be 
characterized as adhering to a philosophy of a high degree of government 
involvement in the protection of a fundamental right.48 Stephen Kobrin has 
described the European approach to privacy as putting the burden of 
protection on society rather than the individual.49 Others have noted that 
“[g]overnment on the European continent is perceived . . . as the protector 
of individual needs, rather than an entity who interferes with those needs.  
Europe is more comfortable with a socialist approach where government 
protects an individual’s liberties, basic needs such as food and shelter, and 
continuing rights to employment.”50 Still others have gone as far as to call 
the European privacy model a “command and control model, with precise 
 
48 See, e.g., Alexander Zinser, The Safe Harbor Solution: Is It An Effective 
Mechanism For International Data Transfers Between The United States 
And The European Union?, 1 OKLA. J. L. & TECH 11 (2004). 
 
49 Stephen J. Kobrin, Safe Harbors are Hard to Find: The Trans-Atlantic 
Data Privacy Dispute, Territorial Jurisdiction and Global Governance, 30
REV. INT’L STUDIES 111, 116 (2004) (contrasting with American approach 
to privacy, emphasizing individual ownership and control over, and 
alienability of, personal information). 
50 Carl Felsenfeld, Unnecessary Privacy, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV.
365, 370 (2002). 
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rules governing the handling of personal information.”51 James Whitman 
mines the European historical and cultural context to declare that European 
privacy is ultimately most concerned with human dignity, and thus “avidly” 
protects a wide range of types of privacy in many areas of day-to-day life.52 
The EU Directive on Data Protection makes clear the approach expected of 
its Member States when it declares that “data-processing systems are 
designed to serve man” and must “respect the fundamental rights of 
individuals, notably the right to privacy.”53 
By contrast, privacy in US law is generally concerned with 
privacy rights against the government.54 “At its conceptual core, the 
American right to privacy still takes much the same form that it took in the 
eighteenth century: It is the right to freedom from intrusions by the state, 
especially in one's own home.”55 Regarding private actors, the information 
privacy philosophy the United States is most often characterized as a 
market-based or largely laissez-faire type of approach (at least for most of 
the nation’s history).56 In this view, privacy rights are property-like; they 
 
51 Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig, Harmonizing Cybertort Law 
For Europe And America, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 13 (2005). 
52 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures Of Privacy: Dignity 
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1156-1158 (2004) (describing 
European protection in the areas of consumer data, credit reporting, 
workplace privacy, civil discovery, dissemination of nude images on the 
Internet, and shielding criminal offenders from public exposure, and further 
describing underpinnings of European privacy culture in the European 
Convention on Human Rights). 
53 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, Preamble par. (2), 24 October 1995. 
54 Kobrin, supra note 49 at 115.  See also Jonathan Zittrain, What the 
Publisher Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an 
Era of Trusted Privication, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1228 (2000). 
55 Whitman, supra note 52 at 1161 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted 
Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America 5 (2000). 
56 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Seizing the Initiative on Privacy: Online Industry 
Presses its Case for Self-Regulation, New York Times October 11, 1999 at 
C8 (describing concerns raised by the Federal Trade Commission regarding 
efficacy of the traditional US self-regulatory model of data protection). 
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are alienable, tradable, and waivable.57 Such an approach is consistent with 
Whitman’s argument that American notions of privacy are grounded in 
liberty, rather than dignity.58 The most important thing is to protect the 
individual from state intrusion into the choices she makes regarding her 
personal information.  Self-regulation by private users of personal 
information is the American ethos, with government stepping in to fill gaps 
reactively, and narrowly.59 Preserving both individual autonomy and 
commercial flexibility has traditionally been paramount, and industry has 
historically been trusted to police itself, particularly where such self-
policing would support continued growth and development of the Internet.  
The Clinton Administration’s Framework for Global Internet Commerce, 
one of the early and few comprehensive federal government statements on 
Internet privacy issues, enumerated encouragement of self-regulation and 
government restraint as two of its core principles.60 
B. Conflicting Legislative Results 
Not surprisingly, the legislative regimes of the two 
jurisdictions in question evolved in markedly different directions.  The laws 
of the United States regarding data protection have justifiably been called a 
“legal patchwork,”61 “fragmented,”62 a “discordant morass,”63 “reactive,”64 
57 See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, at 1246-1249 (April 1998); Murphy, 84 GEO. L. J. 
at 2402-2403. 
58 Whitman, supra note 52, at 1162-4.  Whitman describes American 
anxieties about privacy as being concerned with “maintaining a kind of 
private sovereignty within our own walls.”  In his conception of 
comparative US-EU privacy, “American privacy law is a body caught in the 
gravitational orbit of liberty values, while European law is caught in the 
orbit of dignity.” 
59 See Zinser, supra note 48 at 11 (characterizing US policymaking as 
“reactive,” and in favor of targeted solutions to privacy problems).  
60 See Felsenfeld, supra note 50 at 365; White House Infrastructure Task 
Force, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (July 1997), at 
http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm. 
61 See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 54, at 1229. 
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“a crazy quilt of piecemeal statutes,”65 “sporadic,”66 and “inchoate.”67 
Although Congress has considered a number of bills in this area,68 there is 
to date no comprehensive federal information privacy statute.  Instead, there 
are sector specific laws designed to address specific types and uses of 
personal information.  As a matter of national statutory law, the US 
protects, for example, financial information,69 information about children,70 
health-related information,71 information contained in credit reports,72 video 
rental information,73and certain information regarding cable television 
 
62 See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Trade and Regulatory Goals: The 
Prospects and Limits of Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through 
Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 
61 (2002). 
63 Stephen J. Davidson and Daniel M. Bryant, The Right of Privacy: 
International Discord and the Interface with Intellectual Property Law, 18 
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1 (2001). 
64 See, e.g., Zinser, supra note 48, at 12. 
65 Rustad and Koenig, supra note 51. 
66 Kobrin, supra note 49. 
67 Id. 
68 Recent attempts have included the proposed Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (September 29, 2005); the 
proposed Online Privacy Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 84, 109th Cong. 
January 4, 2005); and the proposed Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 
2005, H.R. 1263, 109th Cong. (March 10, 2005). 
69 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6801 et seq. 
70 See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501 
et seq. 
71 See the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and 
its attendant Privacy Rule. 
72 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1581. 
73 See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710. 
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subscribers.74 Unless a piece of personal information fits within one of the 
above types, it is likely not covered by any specific federal statute.    Some 
protection has been provided by the role played by the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) in protecting against unfair trade practices.  The FTC 
is authorized to investigate “the organization, business, conduct, practices, 
and management of any person, partnership, or corporation engaged in or 
whose business affects commerce . . .”75 More specifically, section 5 of the 
FTC Act authorizes the FTC to pursue complaints of “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce,” including deceptive practices 
relating to the collection and use of personal data.76 Additionally, 
protection against certain specific and intrusive uses has been provided by 
recent federal action in the areas of, for example, SPAM and unwanted 
telemarketing calls.77 By and large, however, most of the immense amount 
of data collected by private interests in the US slips through the statutory 
cracks of US law.78 
Meanwhile, information privacy protection in the European 
Union has long been the subject of comprehensive legislative action.  
Beginning in the 1970’s, several countries developed national laws 
regulating the processing of data about individuals, including collection, 
use, and storage.79 These laws, although emanating from a shared 
 
74 See customer proprietary network information provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222.
75 Banks, savings & loan institutions, credit unions, and common carriers 
are excepted from this authority.  FTC Act Section 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 46 (a). 
76 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1). 
77 See the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act of 2003 (also known as the CAN-SPAM Act), and the 
federal Do-Not-Call Registry. 
78 Some states, notably California, have moved to fill the gaps left by 
federal statutes, but this Article is concerned with statutory action at the 
national level. 
79 See European Commission, Data Protection Background Information, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/adequacy/background-
info_en.htm; Act on Data Processing, Date Files and Individual Liberties, 
January 1978 (France); Act Relating to Personal Data Registers, June 1978 
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understanding of individual rights, did not provide a uniform level of 
protection.80 In an effort to harmonize the differences among national laws 
and facilitate the free flow of data across intra-Union borders, the then-
fifteen Member States of the EU put into effect Directive 95/46/EC on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data (the “EU Data Protection 
Directive” or “EU Directive”).81 The EU Directive prescribes specific 
requirements for the handling (or “processing”) of personal data, defined as 
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”82 
An “identifiable person,” (the “data subject” of the personal data) is “one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”83 
“Processing” of personal data is defined broadly to mean 
“any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”84 The 
Directive covers the processing activities of both “data controllers” (those 
who determine the purposes of, and means for, processing), and “data 
processors” (those who actually process the data on behalf of a controller).85 
(Norway); Data Protection Act, July 1989 (Netherlands); Data Protection 
Act, Number 25 of 1988 (Ireland). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, art. 2(a), 24 October 1995. 
83 Id. 
84 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art. 2(b), 24 October 
1995. 
85 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art. 2(d), 2(e), 24 
October 1995. 
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The Member States of the EU are required to adopt national laws consistent 
with the Directive, which national laws are required to apply where the 
processing activities of a data controller take place in the territory of a 
Member State, where a Member State’s national law applies by virtue of 
international public law, or where a data controller makes use of equipment 
situated within the territory of a Member State.86 
The Directive requires that the laws enacted by Member 
States provide for adherence to certain principles in the processing of 
personal data.   Personal data must be processed fairly, processed in a 
manner consistent with specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, 
maintained accurately, updated periodically, erased or rectified in a timely 
manner, and kept anonymously when identification of data subjects is no 
longer necessary.87 Member States must provide in their national laws that 
personal data may only be processed where 
 
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously; or 
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to 
which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request 
of the data subject entering into a contract; or 
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to 
which the controller is subject; or 
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of 
the data subject; or 
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out 
in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in 
the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed; or 
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate 
interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to 
whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are 
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the data subject which require protection under Article 1(1).88 
86 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.4, 24 October 1995.  
87 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.6, 24 October 1995. 
88 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.7, 24 October 1995. 
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Certain categories of data receive an even higher level of protection under 
the Directive.  Data about race, ethnicity, political or religious affiliation, 
health, sex life, or union membership may not be processed, subject to an 
explicit consent exception, and certain other narrow exceptions.89 
Data controllers must give notice to data subjects of, among 
other things, their own status as data controllers, the purpose of the 
processing, the identities of the recipients of the data, and the fact that the 
data subject has a right of access and correction.90 The access right, 
provided by Article 12 of the Directive, requires Member States to 
guarantee that data subjects may obtain from the data controller information 
regarding the processing of the data subject’s information, including 
categories of data being processed, purpose of the processing, source of the 
data, and the logic by which the data is being processed.91 Article 12 also 
provides that data may be rectified, erased, or blocked, if its processing does 
not comply with the provisions of the Directive.92 Article 14 grants further 
objection rights to the data subject, allowing prohibition of use of data 
where the data subject articulates “compelling legitimate grounds,” and 
enabling the data subject to object to the use of his personal data for direct 
marketing purposes.93 Data subjects also have the right not to be subject to 
decisions about them that are arrived at via automated processing, rather 
than human decision-making.94 
Data controllers face additional requirements and constraints 
under the Directive.  Data security measures must provide (or require from 
its data processors) an “appropriate” level of protection against destruction, 
loss, unauthorized alteration, or unauthorized disclosure.  The 
 
89 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.8, 24 October 1995. 
90 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.10-11, 24 October 
1995. 
91Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.12, 24 October 1995. 
92 Id. 
93 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.14, 24 October 1995. 
94 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.15, 24 October 1995. 
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appropriateness of security measures is to be determined with reference to 
the state of the art regarding data security.95 Any processing involving 
retention of a data processor must be governed by contract wherein the 
processor agrees to act only on instructions from the controller, and also 
assumes the data security responsibilities that bind the controller.96 
Generally, the data controller must also notify the data protection authority 
(“DPA”) of the relevant Member State before carrying out a data processing 
operation that is automatic in nature, either in whole or in part.97 All 
Member States of the union were required by the Directive to enact 
implementing legislation bringing their national laws into harmony with the 
Directive’s requirements by October 1998.98 
C. The Tie That Binds 
The EU Data Protection Directive certainly establishes a 
comprehensive regime, one that might even seem stifling to a person or 
company used to a more American information privacy ethos.  But why 
exactly did Europe’s subjecting itself to a hyper-stringent set of data privacy 
practices gore America’s ox?  The answer is twofold.  First, the value of 
trade between the United States and the EU is enormous.  In 2003, the total 
value of trade with the 15 nations that made up the EU when the Directive 
was adopted was almost $400 billion.99 By one estimate, inclusion of 
transactions between affiliates in the trade calculation would bring the value 
of US-EC trade to $1.7 trillion.100 As the European Union continues to 
 
95 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.17, 24 October 1995. 
96 Id. 
97 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.18, 24 October 1995. 
98 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.32, 24 October 1995. 
99 See Trade with European Union (15): 2003 at 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0011.html#2003. Total trade 
for the first five months of 2005 with the 25 nations of the recently 
expanded Union was $202 billion.  See Trade with European Union: 2005 at 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0003.html.
100 See Gregory Schaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The 
Prospects and Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance 
Through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 29 (2002) (citing Transatlantic Governance in Historical and 
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expand, the value of transactions between the two jurisdictions can be 
expected to continue to grow as well.101 Much of the commercial traffic 
between the United States and the EU is accompanied by, or consists of, 
streams of data.  Sales of goods (for example, the purchase of a pair of 
customized athletic shoes by a French teenager from an American 
multinational102) may involve the collection of information from and/or 
about a customer.  Online purchases of services or technology goods (such 
as software) similarly involve exchanges of information.   
Secondly, the Directive creates the possibility that the 
streams of information alluded to above might come to a halt.  Article 25 
requires the Member States to allow transfers of personal data to countries 
outside of the EU only if “the third country in question ensures an adequate 
level of protection.”103 “Adequacy” is to be assessed based upon a number 
of factors, including “the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the 
proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and 
country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in 
force in the third country in question and the professional rules and security 
measures which are complied with in those countries.”104 A finding of 
inadequacy requires a Member State to take steps to prevent transfers to a 
given third country.105 A third country may enter into negotiations with the 
 
Theoretical Perspective, in Transatlantic Governance in the Global 
Economy 3, 4 (Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2001)). 
101 The European Union currently consists of 25 Member States: Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom.  An additional four nations (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania, and Turkey) are currently candidate countries.   
102 See, e.g., the Nike ID online customization store at 
http://nikeid.nike.com/nikeid/index.jhtml?ref=www.nike.com#home.
103 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.25 (1), 24 October 
1995. 
104 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.25 (2), 24 October 
1995. 
105 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.25 (4), 24 October 
1995. 
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European Commission in order to rectify the situation, and may achieve 
adequacy via its domestic law or its international commitments.106 Article 
26 provides a number of derogations from, or exceptions to, Article 25’s 
prohibition on transfers to countries with inadequate privacy protection.  
Among these are unambiguous consent of the data subject, necessity of the 
transfer for performance or completion of a contract, protection of the vital 
interests of the data subject, and necessity to the public interest.107 
Additionally, a data controller may make certain guarantees regarding 
protection of privacy rights, in order to gain approval from a Member 
State’s DPA for a particular data transfer or set of transfers.108 
As a practical matter, the derogations do not provide much 
relief for a company located in an “inadequate” country that wishes to 
import data from a European Union Member State.  Obtaining unambiguous 
consent from every data subject that is part of a high volume of online 
transactions can be nearly impossible.109 The European Commission’s 
interpretation of what constitutes a “necessary” transfer is extremely narrow 
and renders the necessity-based derogations of little use to most data 
controllers.110 The practical limitations of Article 26 and the stark 
prohibitions of Article 25 have resonance with US-based companies 
because the United States was not at the time of the Directive’s adoption, 
nor is it currently, deemed to provide adequate protection to personal 
data.111 Without some sort of accommodation on either side, the American 
 
106 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.25 (5) – 25 (6), 24 
October 1995. 
107 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art. 26 (1), 24 October 
1995. 
108 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art. 26 (2), 24 October 
1995. 
109 See, e.g., Rose Barcelo, Seeking Suitable Options for Importing Data 
from the European Union, 36 INT’L LAW 985, 995 (Fall 2002). 
110 See, e.g., Rose Barcelo, 36 INT’L LAW at 996. 
111 To date, the following non-Member States have been declared by the 
European Commission to provide adequate protection to personal data, for 
purposes of Article 25: Switzerland (Commission Decision 2000/518/EC on 
July 26, 2000); Canada (Commission Decision 2002/2/EC on December 20, 
2001); Argentina (Commission Decision 2003/490/EC on June 30, 2003); 
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multinationals faced the prospect of not being able to move crucial 
information (including transactional data, marketing profiles, and employee 
records) from the European countries where they were collected to the US 
divisions in which their value would be realized. 
 
D. A Negotiated Solution 
The prospect of a catastrophic cessation of data flows from 
Europe prompted the United States Department of Commerce to enter into 
bilateral negotiations with the European Commission, with the goal of 
finding a data protection solution that would pass muster as “adequate” by 
EU standards without unduly burdening US-based multinationals.112 The 
result was Safe Harbor, a self-certification program that allows participating 
US firms to be deemed adequate protectors of personal data, as far as the 
Member States of the EU are concerned.  Data transfers from all Member 
States to Safe Harbor companies are allowed to continue without prior 
approval from the DPAs of the Member States.113 Participating companies 
join Safe Harbor by annually certifying to the Department of Commerce 
that they are in compliance with seven Safe Harbor Principles.114 They 
must also state in their published privacy statements that they adhere to the 
principles.  A firm may achieve the promised adherence by “(1) join[ing] a 
self-regulatory privacy program that adheres to the safe harbor's 
 
Guernsey (Commission Decision 2003/821/EC on November 21, 2003); 
and the Isle of Man (Commission Decision 2004/411/EC on April 28, 
2004).  See, e.g., Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection 
of Personal Data in Third Countries at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/index_en.
htm.
112 See Kobrin, supra note 49, at 113. 
113 See Safe Harbor Benefits, available at 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html. See also generally 
Commission Decision on Adequacy of Safe Harbor, July 28, 2000, 
available at http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/deci0728.html.
114 See Shaffer, supra note 100, at 62. 
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requirements; or (2) develop[ing] its own self regulatory privacy policy that 
conforms to the safe harbor.”115 The Department of Commerce maintains a 
list of companies that have self-certified.116 
The seven Safe Harbor Principles are: Notice, Choice, 
Onward Transfer, Access, Security, Data Integrity, and Enforcement.  In 
essence, the principles require that a firm notify data subjects about the 
purpose for the collection and use of their information, and that the data 
subject be able to choose whether the data will be used for any other 
purpose or disclosed to a third party.  In order to disclose data to a third 
party  (Onward Transfer), the firm must comply with the Notice and Choice 
principles.  Data subjects must have access to their data and be reasonably 
able to correct, amend, or delete their information.  Firms must take 
reasonable steps to provide effective data security and data integrity, and 
they must provide procedures and mechanisms for handling data subjects’ 
complaints and disputes regarding the handling of their data.117 
Participation in Safe Harbor is currently open to 
organizations that are subject to the regulatory authority of the Federal 
Trade Commission or the United States Department of Transportation.118 
Both agencies have indicated via letters to the European Commission that 
they will take action against Safe Harbor companies who do not meet their 
obligations under the program.119 Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, along with the terms of the Safe Harbor program, 
participants who fail to provide adequate protection may be subject to an 
 
115 See Safe Harbor Overview, available at 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html.
116 The Department of Commerce Safe Harbor list may be found at 
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list.
117 For a more detailed treatment of the Safe Harbor Principles, see 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html.
118 This means that companies in certain industries, including much of the 
financial services sector, is unable to participate in Safe Harbor, and thus 
have not resolved their issues regarding Article 25 of the Data Protection 
Directive. 
119 See Safe Harbor Overview: Government Enforcement at 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html.
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FTC action for engaging in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”120 A delinquent Safe Harbor firm may find itself 
subject to administrative orders, penalties of up to $12,000 per day, and 
removal from the Safe Harbor list.121 
Safe Harbor has received mixed reviews.  To some, it 
represents a successful compromise that may contribute to “a gradual 
convergence in data privacy practices.”122 To others, Safe Harbor means 
that both Americans and Europeans find themselves “subject to a privacy 
regime that is not of their making and certainly does not reflect their 
common interests.”123 Participation levels have not been overwhelming.  
As of January 2006, approximately 850 companies were current in their 
certification status with the Safe Harbor program.124 This represents a fairly 
small percentage of US companies in total.  Of the current Safe Harbor 
companies, only 60 are members of the Fortune 500.  Presumably, 
companies of that size and global reach were the types of companies for 
whom Safe Harbor was designed in the first place.  The European 
Commission has voiced disappointment in the number of registered Safe 
Harbor organizations,125 but has also noted the absence of complaints from 
data subjects as one indication that those companies that are registered are 
mainly in compliance.126 Of greater concern to the Commission is the fact 
 
120 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (a) (1). 
121 See Safe Harbor Overview: Government Enforcement at 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html.
122 Shaffer, supra note 100, at 66. 
123 Kobrin, supra note 49, at 128. 
124 See Safe Harbor List at 
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/webPages/safe+harbor+list!Ope
nDocument&Start=772.
125 The Commission is even considering analyzing the market share of Safe 
Harbor companies as a way of measuring whether the program is likely 
having a significant impact on data practices. 
126 See Commission Staff Working Document on the Implementation of 
Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the adequate protection of personal 
data provided by the Safe Harbour privacy Principles and Frequently Asked 
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that few Safe Harbor companies have incorporated the Safe Harbor 
Principles into their written privacy policies to the Commission’s 
satisfaction, and the EC seeks a more proactive compliance effort from the 
Department of Commerce and the FTC.127 How did the EU and US get to 
the current state of play regarding data privacy, and to what extent have 
they addressed their privacy issues?  More importantly, where do they go 
from here in terms of their relationship vis-à-vis privacy?  The next Part 
examines and assesses the interaction of the US and EU using concepts 
from game theory and attempts to chart a course for a more satisfactory 
outcome. 
 
Questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, October 10, 2004, at 
6.
127 See Id. at 7-8. 
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IV. Setting the Model
The utility of game theoretic models to analyze problems of 
law and policy is well established.128 Scholars have used game theory 
analysis to model competitive behavior with respect to valuable intangible 
assets, such as intellectual property.129 They have also long used game 
theory to better understand and predict the actions of states in the areas of 
international law and international trade.130 The State vs. State context of 
the data privacy game presents a competition among nations to capture or 
retain the value of intangible information and may be modeled separately 
from either the IP or the international trade games. 
One potentially useful game theory model for examining the 
State vs. State context is the normal form game, a 2x2 
competition/cooperation matrix, the most familiar flavor of which is the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.131 In the normal form game, the players move 
simultaneously, each choosing a strategy without knowledge of the course 
of action chosen by the other player (although each player may know a 
good deal of information about other aspects of their playing 
 
128 See generally Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of 
Competition, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 285 (Fall 1991) (Citing game theory 
applications in collective bargaining, antitrust, contracts, sales, property 
law, industrial organizations, and agency theory, and relating legal 
applications of game theory to cross-purposes optimization).  
129 See, e.g., David W. Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the 
Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational 
Corporation, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 305, 317 (Fall 1991) (modeling foreign 
direct investment decisions, including technology transfer); Ruth Okediji, 
Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS 
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 819 (Summer 2003) (analyzing 
negotiation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property, or TRIPS Agreement). 
130 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of 
International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679 (Summer 2003); Michael Chinen, 
“Game Theory and Customary International Law: A Response to Professors 
Goldsmith and Posner,” 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143 (Fall 2001). 
131 Shubik, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. at 288. 
6/18/2004 2:58 PM (2K) 
[Privacy Gambit Draft v1.doc] --  34
environment).132 The players face a binary choice of strategies, promising 
different payoffs for each player depending upon which of the two available 
strategies she chooses, and which of two strategies is adopted by her co-
player.133 In a game of complete but imperfect information, a common 
variant, the players know their own available strategies and payoffs, as well 
as the available strategies and payoffs of their co-player.  As noted above, 
however, a player does not know which strategy her co-player will actually 
choose.134 Payoffs are often represented, and will be represented here, as 
dollar amounts gained or lost by the players. 
A number of assumptions are necessary in creating the 
model and situating the players therein.  The US faces a choice between 
regulating uses and transfers of personal data, or permitting such uses and 
transfers to occur without interference (the choice will be represented in the 
model as Regulate/Don’t Regulate).  Regulation entails direct dollar costs in 
the form of creation and maintenance of administrative and/or judicial 
apparatus to enforce the regulatory regime.  The decision to regulate also 
reduces US revenues from commercial uses of personal data.  A scheme 
that regulates data flows may lead to certain transactions being halted that 
would otherwise be completed.  Such a scheme may also slow down 
transactions that would otherwise be completed on a more timely basis.  
Fewer transactions may be completed by US firms, and those firms’ 
revenues can be expected to decrease over time.  Delays in completing 
those transactions that do succeed will also cost the firms revenue.  For the 
US as a player in the game, the decrease in the revenue of US firms can be 
represented as an aggregate loss by all US firms, or as a loss of tax revenues 
for the US as a state (such tax revenue loss amounting to a percentage of the 
aggregate loss by the firms). 
The EU faces a choice between permitting data use and 
transfers by foreign firms on a fairly laissez faire basis, or restricting such 
activity (represented in the model as Allow/Restrict).  Restriction entails a 
direct cost, just as regulation does for the US.  However, we assume the 
EU’s marginal cost to be lower than the US cost, due to a more developed 
pre-existing infrastructure for the regulation of commercial transactions, 
 
132 See Douglas G. Baird et al., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6-7 (1994). 
133 See Id. at 8. 
134 Id. at 10. 
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including data transactions.135 A decision by the EU to Restrict reduces US 
revenues, potentially by a larger amount than that caused by a US decision 
to Regulate (due to, for example, less concern on the part of EU regulators 
for revenue effects of their activities on foreign firms than US regulators 
would likely demonstrate for their own domestic firms).  If the EU decides 
to Allow, it faces a number of costs, some more quantifiable than others.  
There will, of course, be political costs for a government that is seen as 
failing to protect what its constituents hold to be a fundamental right.  There 
may even be an increase in direct litigation costs, as citizens either sue EU 
Member States for failing to protect their rights, or make increased use of 
the administrative and judicial apparatus in enforcing rights against private 
actors (whose data use and transfer activities are likely to increase under an 
“Allow” regime). 
Even more important from a strategic perspective is the 
question of what costs in the way of lost revenues the EU might incur by 
deciding to Allow.  If the EU Restricts, more transactions that would 
otherwise have been completed between EU consumers and US merchants 
will instead be completed between EU consumers and EU firms.  Therefore, 
by Allowing, the EU creates the possibility for the US to capture more of 
the value of the personal data of EU consumers.  This value is made up of 
the raw value of transactions with EU consumers, plus whatever multiplier 
effect operates on future transactions.136 The value-capture issue forces the 
EU, when making the Allow/Restrict decision, to consider the global reach 
of US firms, the relatively aggressive marketing culture of US business, and 
the general orientation among US firms toward maximizing the use of, and 
return on, personal data as an investment in the growth of the company. 
In the model, for convenience, we assume that the value of 
the personal data of EU consumers is 100.  The US faces a cost to Regulate 
of 20. The EU maintains a baseline cost of regulation of 10, reflecting a 
more highly regulated economy in general than that of the US.  If the EU 
chooses to Restrict, it incurs an additional cost of 10.  If the US declines to 
 
135 See discussion supra, Part III(A).
136 For example, maintaining a robust database of customer identifying data, 
preferences, and purchase history may lead to more transactions in the 
future with existing customers than if no such data is kept.  Additionally, 
more new customers may be marketed to, and transacted with in the future, 
if consumer data can be collected and transferred to a central marketing 
department for analysis. 
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Regulate, while the EU chooses to Allow, the US captures 70% of the value 
of the personal data, with the EU capturing 30%, less its baseline regulatory 
costs of 10, for a net payoff of 20.  If the US declines to regulate while the 
EU Restricts, the US captures 40% of the value, while the EU receives 
60%, less regulation costs of 10 and costs to Restrict of 10, resulting in a net 
payoff of 40.  If the US Regulates while the EU Allows, each captures half 
the value of the data, less their respective regulation costs (20 in the case of 
the US, and 10 in the case of the EU.  If the US Regulates while the EU 
Restricts, the US earns 30% of the value, less regulation costs of 20 (for a 
payoff of 10), while the EU captures 70% of the value, less baseline 
regulation costs and cost to Restrict (for a net payoff of 70 minus 20, or 50).  
The matrix and each party’s payoffs appear as below137:
137 In each pair of payoffs, the US payoff is listed first, and the EU payoff 
second. 
 
(40, 40) 
 
(70, 20) 
 
(10, 50) 
 
(30, 40) 
 
Allow Restrict
EU
US
Regulate
Don’t 
Regulate
6/18/2004 2:58 PM (2K) 
[Privacy Gambit Draft v1.doc] --  37
A strictly dominant strategy for the US under this model is 
non-Regulation.138 Regardless of whether the EU decides to Allow or 
Restrict, the US is better off choosing not to Regulate (earning a payoff of 
70 versus 30 in the event of an Allow strategy by the EU, and earning a 
payoff of 40 versus 10 in the event of a Restrict strategy by the EU).  Given 
the dominance of the Don’t Regulate strategy for the US, the EU, acting 
rationally, will be forced to pursue a Restrict strategy.  As the EU expects 
the US to choose Don’t Regulate, it is better off choosing Restrict (and 
earning 40), rather than Allow (earning 20).  
Although the game as set forth above reaches an equilibrium, 
it does not necessarily produce an optimal or even desirable result. The US 
ends up capturing less value than it otherwise would, and processing fewer 
transactions with EU consumers.  This is obviously a poor result for the US, 
but it also problematic for EU consumers, some significant number of 
whom want to transact with US firms.  There are transactions for which US 
firms might be better suited, either because EU firms do not provide the 
goods/services involved, or because US firms can provide the 
goods/services more cheaply or efficiently.  The inability of such 
transactions to be consummated represents a loss to the system, potential 
value uncaptured by anyone.  Additionally, there may be some appetite 
among US consumers for some regulation of US firms.139 An outcome that 
essentially means zero regulation by the US of its firms is an unfavorable 
one for US consumers.   
Beyond the suboptimality of the result, the model as defined 
so far does not quite capture or predict the actual outcome of the game as 
“played” in the real world. The US and EU forged a solution to their data 
privacy dilemma that provided not only more than the zero regulation 
regime anticipated by the normal form game, but also less than the 
 
138 A strictly dominant strategy is one that is always the best choice for a 
particular player, regardless of the strategy chosen by the other player.  See 
Baird et al., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW, at 11. 
139 The vigorous nature of the debate over privacy issues in the US, and the 
advocacy activities of organizations such as the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Coalition 
Against Unsolicited Commercial Email, provide strong evidence of such a 
phenomenon. 
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predicted draconian restrictions on data usage.140 The predictive 
shortcoming of the normal form game here is due to its inadequately 
capturing the structure of the relationship between the players.  Unlike the 
motorist and pedestrian often used to illustrate tort applications of the 
normal form game141, the US and EU do not make a single decision 
regarding data protection with no idea of what move will be made by their 
opponent.  Instead, the players here make a series of moves as part of an 
ongoing, recurring set of trade actions.  Rather than being simultaneous, as 
in the normal form game, the players’ interaction is dynamic and iterative.  
A party may make a move in one round of play with an eye toward the 
effect of that move on future rounds.  The parties use their opponent’s early 
round moves to inform strategy for later rounds.  Thus, a more robust tool 
for analyzing the US-EU data competition is the extensive form game, 
which provides the players an opportunity to assess and re-calculate 
strategy over the course of repeated interactions. 
The extensive form game models multiple rounds of actions 
taken by the players, the sequence in which actions are taken, and the 
information and options available to players during each round.142 Despite 
its usefulness in iterative interactions, however, it is possible to use the 
extensive form game to model an interaction between the US and EU that 
does little more than replicate the results of the normal form game.  For 
example, in the figure below, with the US moving first, backwards 
induction indicates that the outcome will be Don’t Regulate/Restrict.  
Moving last, and faced with the indicated choices, the EU will choose 
Restrict over Allow in the event of a US decision to Regulate (earning 50 
rather than 40, as in the normal form model above), and will also choose 
Restrict over Allow in the event of a US decision not to Regulate (earning 
40 over 20, as in the normal form model above).143 The US, in determining 
 
140 See discussion, supra at III.D., regarding the US-EU Safe Harbor 
program. 
141 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 
43 (3d ed. 2003) (citing John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory 
of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability 
Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980); Peter A. Diamond, Single 
Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 104 (1974). 
142 See generally Shubik, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. at 286-288. 
143 By convention, in each pair of payoffs, the payoff of the first mover, in 
this case the US, is listed first. 
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its first move, will take in to account that the EU’s only rational strategy in 
the second round is Restrict.  Therefore, in order to secure a payoff of 30 
rather than 10, the US will choose Don’t Regulate. 
 
[Insert US-EU XFG #1] 
 
Under the current set of payoffs, the outcome is no different 
if the EU is the first mover (See figure below).  Moving last, the US will 
choose Don’t Regulate as its more lucrative strategy in the case of both 
possible moves by the EU.  Don’t Regulate nets the US a payoff of 70 over 
30 in the event of an Allow decision, and a payoff of 40 over 10 if the EU 
has chosen Restrict.  Knowing the decision set faced by the US in the last 
(10, 50) (40, 40) (30, 40) (70, 20)
US Regulates US Does Not  
Regulate 
EU  
Restricts
EU  
Restricts
EU  
Allows 
EU  
Allows 
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move, the EU will choose Restrict in the first move, in order to earn 40 
rather than 20.144 
To demonstrate more accurately the impact of iterative play 
in the US-EU data protection game, we must make adjustments to the 
model.  The revised model introduces an additional round of play, with the 
EU playing first.  The EU chooses strategy, the US follows, and then the 
EU receives a final play.145 Along with the additional round, there are 
 
144 By convention, in each pair of payoffs, the payoff of the first mover, in 
this case the EU, is listed first. 
145 It should be noted that, although we posit three rounds of play here, the 
model may also be framed as having up to n rounds, with n being an odd 
number.  The EU makes the first and nth moves, and every odd-numbered 
move in between. 
(50, 10) (40, 40) (40, 30) (20, 70)
EU 
Restricts 
EU Allows
US  
Regulates US  Regulates 
US Does  
Not  
Regulate 
US Does  
Not  
Regulate 
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adjustments to the parties’ payoffs, due in part to an additional strategy 
available to the EU: Halt. 
 A number of additional assumptions are necessary in 
analyzing the revised model with the Halt strategy available to the EU.  
First, adopting the Halt strategy imposes a significant cost on the EU.  For 
purposes of the model, employing the Halt strategy means ceasing all data 
transfers from the EU to the US.  It is obvious that such a move would 
heavily and negatively impact US payoffs, but the strategy is not without 
pain for the EU.  The Halt strategy would necessitate more rigorous (and 
expensive) enforcement in order to ensure that no personal information is 
transferred to the US; such enforcement costs can be expected to reduce the 
net amount of any payoff to the EU from the game.  Additionally, 
collaborative opportunities between US firms and EU firms would be lost 
almost completely under the Halt strategy.  Without the ability to share data 
about customers by transferring data files to US joint venture partners, for 
example, EU firms will be less able to strategically exploit the value of their 
information by forming marketing alliances across the Atlantic.  Finally, 
some of the data controllers seeking to move data from the EU to the US are 
EU firms, or at least EU divisions of US firms.  Such firms or divisions may 
employ EU citizens locally and pay taxes to EU Member States.  Cessation 
of data flows would impact the revenues of these local players, and reduce 
the wages and taxes that they would typically pay in the EU.      
Given the costs of the Halt strategy to the EU, the EU will 
not employ the strategy lightly.  If during any round the US chooses 
Regulate as its strategy, the EU can be expected not to pursue the Halt 
strategy during its turn.  If the US chooses Don’t Regulate, however, it can 
expect the EU to choose Halt in the next round, leading to a zero payoff for 
the US.  We also assume that the cost to Restrict is cumulative; if the EU 
incurs such cost in multiple rounds, then the total cost to Restrict will be a 
multiple of the base restriction cost of 10.  For example, if the EU initially 
Restricts, and then Restricts again after the US moves, its additional cost to 
Restrict will be 20 rather than the 10 incurred when the Restrict strategy is 
chosen (only once) in the normal form game.  Therefore, the payoff to the 
EU will be reduced by 10, in the event that the players pursue a Restrict-
Regulate-Restrict chain of strategies.   
Other payoffs are similarly affected by the iterative nature of 
the game, and the particular sequence in which moves play out.  If the US 
Regulates in response to a Restrict decision by the EU, the payoff to the US 
is reduced by 10.  This result reflects increased costs caused by the 
adjustment on the part of US businesses to the practical limitations of the 
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EU restrictions coupled with the legal burdens of a new US regulatory 
scheme.  If the EU Allows initially, and then Allows again following a US 
play of Regulate, it gains incremental revenue (its persistently permissive 
environment acting cumulatively and providing space for more EU-
involved transactions to occur) and sees a +10 change in its payoff over the 
Allow-Regulate pairing of the normal form game. 
The players’ payoffs thus emerge as follows: If the parties 
pursue Restrict-Regulate-Restrict, the EU earns 40 and the US earns 10, 
while if they pursue Restrict-Regulate-Allow, the EU earns 40 and the US 
earns 30.  A choice by the US not to Regulate following an EU Restrict 
decision leads to a 30-30 split in payoffs if the EU Restricts again, a payoff 
of 50 for the EU with a zero payoff for the US if the EU Halts, and a payoff 
of EU=20 and US=70 if the EU Allows on its second turn.  If the players 
pursue Allow-Regulate-Restrict, the EU earns 50 and the US earns 10, 
while if they pursue Allow-Regulate-Allow, the EU earns 50 and the US 
earns 30.  Meanwhile, a choice by the US not to Regulate following an EU 
Allow decision leads to a payoff of EU=40 and US=30 if the EU Restricts, a 
payoff of 50 for the EU with a zero payoff for the US if the EU Halts, and a 
payoff of EU=20 and US=70 if the EU Allows again on its second turn.  
These payoffs are illustrated in the figure below. 
 
(40, 10) (40, 30)
(30, 30) (20, 70) (50, 10) (50, 40)
(40, 30) (20, 70)
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We can predict that the US will not pursue any strategy that 
would present the EU with a Restrict/Halt/Allow set of strategy choices.  
When presented with such a choice, the EU will always choose Halt, opting 
to receive a payoff of 50 rather than 30 (in the case of a Restrict-Don’t 
Regulate-Restrict progression of play), 20 (in the case of either Restrict-
Don’t Regulate-Allow or Allow-Don’t Regulate-Allow), or 40 (Allow-
Don’t Regulate-Restrict).  The only way to avoid the EU’s choosing the 
Halt strategy (and consigning the US to a payoff of 0) is for the US not to 
choose Don’t Regulate.  Knowing that the US will not elect a strategy that 
presents the Halt option to the EU, we can effectively remove the branches 
of the tree that include a choice by the US not to Regulate.  Only the 
Restrict-Regulate-Restrict, Restrict-Regulate-Allow, Allow-Regulate-
Restrict, and Allow-Regulate-Allow progressions are viable.  Both 
progressions that begin with Allow provide higher payoffs for the EU than 
the progressions that begin with Restrict (50 versus 40).  Intuitively, this 
makes sense, as the two Allow progressions provide more of an opportunity 
to avoid cumulative enforcement costs associated with the Restrict strategy 
over multiple rounds of play.  As between the two remaining outcomes that 
result from an Allow-first strategy, the EU is indifferent, as either will yield 
a payoff of 50.   
If, after an Allow-Regulate set of moves by the players, the 
EU is indifferent between Allow and Restrict, how did the players arrive at 
the current state of affairs, Safe Harbor (a regime of mild regulation by the 
US) and an Allow choice by the EU?  One explanation involves each 
player’s communicating important information to the other in advance of, or 
even simultaneously with, its actual moves in the game.  First, the EU 
communicates to the US a credible threat to reduce its payoff from data 
transfers to zero.  The framework constructed by the Data Protection 
Directive supports this threat by requiring Member States to take steps to 
discontinue the flow of data to states not deemed adequate protectors of 
personal information.146 In any round where such a strategy is available to 
the EU, the EU rationally adopts it, because of the opportunity for a 
superior payoff.  Knowing this fact, and respecting the threat, the US has an 
incentive to avoid the “Halt” choice presenting itself in any given round of 
play.  Thus, the US is pushed toward the adoption of some kind of Regulate 
strategy.   
 
146 See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, art.25, 24 October 
1995. 
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Once the Regulate strategy is chosen by the US, there is still 
the question of whether the EU will choose Restrict or Allow (each of 
which offers the same EU payoff).  The US has an incentive to attempt to 
induce an outcome that produces a higher US payoff (Allow, rather than 
Restrict).  One way to do this might be to communicate a commitment to 
protecting personal information, such as by making an a priori promise to 
Regulate, albeit mildly.  The EU might cooperate with such a move by the 
US (by Allowing rather than Restricting on its second and later turns) 
because the certainty of some regulation by the US is better than the 
uncertainty of the game without the US commitment. It is also possible that 
preserving other aspects of the trade relationship between the players is 
worth choosing a strategy that makes the rival better off, especially when it 
can be done without making the mover worse off.  By allowing the US to 
communicate some commitment to privacy and implement some mild form 
of regulation, Safe Harbor, and the Allow-Regulate-Allow progression that 
it represents, thus presents a Pareto superior outcome to the Allow-
Regulate-Restrict progression that might otherwise unfold.147 
So which player has “won,” or is winning, this version of the 
data privacy game?  The short answer is the United States.  Although it has 
been persuaded to adopt a form of a Regulate strategy, such regulation is 
relatively mild.  The Safe Harbor regime does not reach the level of 
comprehensiveness of the privacy protection systems in the nations of the 
EU, and seems to preserve elements of the historical American laissez-faire 
approach.  For example, rather than US companies’ being subject to blanket 
rules, the Safe Harbor regime allows a subset of those companies to “opt in” 
to a privacy-protective mode of operation.  Arguably, this would be a self-
selecting group of firms that consider privacy protection important, and 
large numbers of firms that should be the object of regulation will escape 
scrutiny.  The companies set their own specific rules, via their privacy 
policies, although they must align such rules with the Safe Harbor 
principles.  Further, members of Safe Harbor largely self-report their 
progress in achieving privacy goals, and they have the option to have 
 
147 A transaction or allocation of resources is Pareto superior to another if it 
makes at least one participant better off, without making any participant 
worse off.  A Pareto optimal state of affairs is one where any reallocation of 
resources would only increase the wealth of one party at the expense of 
another.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 12-13 
(6th Ed. 2003). 
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privacy disputes settled privately.148 Other nations that have earned the 
“adequate” designation from the EU have had to create much more 
pervasive and comprehensive systems in order to do so.149 
The EU’s own assessment of the game illustrates the degree 
to which the US has been able to implement a “Regulate Lite” system.  The 
Commission Staff Working Document on the implementation of Safe 
Harbor (the “Safe Harbor Report”), required by Decision 520/2000/EC150,
reports that, although there has been steady growth in the number of Safe 
Harbor companies, the absolute number of companies signed up for the 
program is still small, and the market share represented by such companies 
has not been analyzed.151 Therefore, the actual impact of the program on 
the marketplace may be slight.  Further, the privacy performance of 
members of the program has yet to be audited by US regulators, and it is 
unclear at best whether any of the members’ privacy policies undergo 
regulatory scrutiny.152 The EU Safe Harbor Report expresses concern with 
the effectiveness of Safe Harbor companies’ attempts to translate the Safe 
 
148 See Safe Harbor Frequently Asked Questions FAQ 6, available at 
http://export.gov/safeharborFAQ6SelfCertFINAL.htm; FAQ 11, available 
at http://export.gov/safeharborFAQ11FINAL.htm.
149 For example, Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act (“PIPEDA”) is broad-based, applying, with certain 
exceptions, to “every organization in respect of personal information that 
the organization collects, uses or discloses in the course of commercial 
activities; or is about an employee of the organization . . .”  PIPEDA 
imposes specific affirmative obligations on collection, use, disclosure, 
access, notice, and the like.  Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c.5. 
150 Decision 520/2000/EC requires the Commission to assess Safe Harbor 
three years after its announcement and evaluate whether the system is 
providing adequate protection.  See Commission Staff Working Document 
on the Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the 
Adequate Protection of Personal Data provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy 
Principles and related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the 
Department of Commerce 3 (October 20, 2004). 
151 Id. at 5. 
152 Id. at 6. 
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Harbor principles into written (and posted) privacy policies, and proposes a 
more proactive posture on the part of the Department of Commerce and the 
Federal Trade Commission in policing these issues.153 The issues raised by 
the Safe Harbor Report are indicative of a regime that is still functioning in 
a largely self-regulatory manner, with mild government oversight, rather 
than the all-encompassing regulation that could have been.   
The game’s outcome is not a pure victory for the US 
however, nor is it a pure loss for the EU.  Although the Commission notes 
that there have been no comprehensive audits of compliance with Safe 
Harbor principles, it also notes that it has received no complaints from data 
subjects.154 The number of Safe Harbor complaints referred to alternative 
dispute resolution (“ADR”) organizations such as TRUSTe, the Direct 
Marketing Association, BBBOnline, and the American Arbitration 
Association, has been “insignificant,” such that the Commission does not 
have enough of a sample to evaluate fully the privacy decisions of the 
program’s ADR providers.155 
It may be that, from the perspective of the European data 
subject, US data usage under Safe Harbor has not been objectionable, or at 
least not sufficiently objectionable for the harm done to outweigh the 
transaction costs of invoking the complaint system.  And despite the issues 
raised in the Report, the Commission finds that the US Department of 
Commerce is generally “carrying out its role in accordance with the Safe 
Harbor requirements.”156 Additionally, there is much anecdotal evidence 
that US firms are becoming more thoughtful about their data protection 
posture and policies.  A proliferation of written (and posted) privacy 
policies, the installation of executive level hires with titles like Chief 
Privacy Officer, and the institution by some companies of data privacy 
audits are a few examples of this trend. 157 Even though the result here can 
 
153 See Decision 520/2000/EC, supra note 150, at 7-8.
154 Id. at 6. 
155 Id. at 11. 
156 Id. at 13. 
157 See, e.g., John Schwartz, The Nation: Surveillance 101; Privacy and 
Security on Campus, NEW YORK TIMES, August 4, 2002; Claudia Rose, In 
Business; Keeping it Confidential, NEW YORK TIMES, March 3, 2002. 
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be counted as a US win, it certainly presents an outcome much more 
favorable to the EU than that which would result from total US non-
cooperation. 
The US-EU outcome contains elements of two types of game 
settings recognized in the game theory literature.  The data privacy 
competition is related to both cooperation games, where the players 
mutually benefit from cooperating, but only repeated play discourages 
defection, and coordination games, where “each state’s best move depends 
on the move of the other state.”158 The keys to bringing about a semblance 
of a “win-win” outcome, as in many iterative interactions, are mutual 
concern for the future, an expectation that the players will encounter each 
other again, and the capacity for a player to punish the other in some future 
period.159 When these keys are present, iteration can lead to more 
cooperative behavior than defecting behavior, and to more jointly beneficial 
outcomes.160 The trade relationship between the United States and the 
European Union (especially as regards personal information) fits the classic 
criteria for this sort of result.  The volume and connectedness of their 
mutual trade make the two parties extremely important partners to each 
other, and their interactions can be expected to continue into future periods 
without end.  Further, the capacity for punishment carries particular potency 
in the data arena, given the pervasiveness and importance of data as both a 
commodity itself, and as a vital component of trade in all other 
commodities.161 
Game theory also predicts the structural and institutional 
underpinnings of the US-EU data privacy result. Where several possible 
equilibria exist, focal points can be essential to bringing about a particular, 
jointly beneficial one.  A focal point is anything that tends to focus the 
players’ attention on a particular equilibrium, in a way that is recognized by 
all players, such that such equilibrium is the one expected, and ultimately 
 
158 Chinen, 23 Mich. J. Int’l L. at 148-149. 
159 Id. at 167. 
160 See Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in 
the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 Melb. U. L. Rev. 416, 419 
(August 1999) (citing Robert Axelrod, the Evolution of Cooperation 
(1984)). 
161 See discussion supra at II.A. 
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implemented, by the players.162 Communication is a means for creating 
focal points, and thus treaties, or similar agreements, can serve the as focal 
points in interactions between states.  Cooperative moves that would lead to 
high joint payoffs can be recorded in an agreement in order to inform 
parties as they consider their moves during the life of the agreement, and to 
set a minimum behavioral benchmark.163 In the case of the US-EU data 
privacy competition, the EU Privacy Directive, as an agreement among the 
EU Member States, and the Safe Harbor program (including the reporting 
mechanism of the Working Party), as an agreement between the EU and the 
US, serve the focal point function by focusing the players on strategy 
choices, and therefore equilibria, that involve some level of regulation by 
the US, in order to avoid possible outcomes that might invoke a cessation of 
data flows from the EU to the US.   
Establishment of institutions can also engender cooperative 
strategies such as those employed by the players in the current game.  
Jointly created institutions, such as Safe Harbor, can be used as a method 
for implementing cooperative strategies.  Their joint nature increases the 
likelihood that the players will not only cooperate initially, but will 
cooperate in a sustained manner over time.164 Like agreements, institutions 
can also serve to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs associated with 
dynamic playing environments.165 Where the underlying assumptions and 
setting are subject to evolution, institutions can be used to adjust payoffs 
and commitments in an orderly and mutually beneficial manner, with 
minimal harm to the relationship between the players.166 Given the 
dynamic nature of the US-EU data collection and usage environment, and 
the vital nature of the trade, creation of institutions such as the Safe Harbor 
framework is entirely predictable based on a careful application of game 
theory concepts in this space. 
 
162 Chinen, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. at 153. 
163 See Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary 
International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113, 1171 (1999). 
164 Frischmann, 51 BUFF. L. REV. at 719. 
165 Id. at 683. 
166 Id. 
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V. Conclusion
What is the future of the US-EU data privacy game?  Have 
the players reached an equilibrium that is, in addition to being mutually 
beneficial, also stable?  What changes can be expected in the relationship 
between the players, and in their views regarding the strategies available to 
them in the ongoing competition?  How will the parties seek either to seize 
further advantage, or to protect gains under the current equilibrium?  Of 
course, none of the answers to the above questions can be predicted with 
certainty, but the play of the game thus far, and the levers used by the 
parties to arrive at the current state of the world, provide some guidance.  
The parties have used communication and institutions to create focal points 
and reduce uncertainty.  Communication of a credible threat to halt data 
flows, and the existence of a supranational institution to facilitate carrying 
out the threat, led to the adoption of mild form of regulation by the United 
States, rather than no regulation at all.  The Safe Harbor program itself 
represents an institution that sets baseline expectations for acceptable 
strategy choices in the ongoing game, and also provides communication 
opportunities.   
The EU continues to signal, via the EU Safe Harbor Report, 
that certain US strategy choices (more proactive oversight, audits of Safe 
Harbor companies by regulators, analysis of Website privacy policies) are 
more conducive to continuation of the mutually favorable current 
equilibrium than others.  The EU also continues to signal that “the EU panel 
and data protection authorities should invite organizations that subscribe to 
the Principles to effectively comply with the Principles and use their power 
to suspend data flows if they conclude that there is a substantial likelihood 
that the Principles are being violated.167 Cessation of data flows is still an 
option, and both players understand that.  The institutional anchors and 
communication devices that have been put in place in this game can be 
expected to preserve the core gains (to the EU as a player, to the US as a 
player, and to their data subjects) of the current equilibrium, while slowly 
introducing more substance to the “Regulate Lite” strategy.  The individual 
European citizen will not be completely let alone, but her data privacy 
rights with respect to United States actors will certainly exceed zero.  
 
167 EU Safe Harbor Report at 8. 
